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The Indian Securities Fraud Class 
Action: Is Class Arbitration the 
Answer? 
Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Randall S. Thomas* 
Abstract: 
In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for 
securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian 
shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent 
all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, 
and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better 
financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India 
does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs 
of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the 
other hand, the 2013 law enacted a public financing regime for securities fraud 
class actions and it is possible third-party financing will be permitted; these 
mechanisms may make up some of the loss in effectiveness caused by the lack of 
contingency fees. It is still too early to tell. 
Yet, commentators are very pessimistic that the Indian securities fraud class 
action will do much good because the Indian court system is glacially slow. For 
example, it takes over six years on average to resolve some civil appeals. 
The solution to this problem in the 2013 law was to channel the securities fraud 
class action to a special tribunal, the National Company Litigation Tribunal 
(“NCLT”). Yet, this type of solution has been tried before in India: special 
tribunals tend to quickly take on the negative characteristics of the general courts. 
This may be why very few securities fraud lawsuits have been filed since the 2013 
law was enacted. 
We propose a different solution to the problem of the Indian court system: class 
arbitration. As we explain, although class arbitration is not perfect, it may better 
facilitate robust private enforcement than the Indian court system. 
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In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement 
regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other 
countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on 
their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those 
shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire 
class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the 
United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, 
so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for 
collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other hand, the 2013 law 
enacted a public-financing regime for securities fraud class actions and it is 
possible third-party financing will be permitted; these mechanisms may 
make up some of the loss in effectiveness caused by the lack of contingency 
fees. It is still too early to tell. 
All of this is true on paper. Yet, commentators are very pessimistic that 
the Indian securities fraud class action will do much good. The primary 
reason is that the Indian court system is notoriously unhurried. We have seen 
some data that suggests it takes over six years on average to resolve some 
civil appeals. And that’s just the appeal. Who will bother to file a securities 
fraud lawsuit if it takes a decade to conclude? 
The solution to this problem in the 2013 law was to channel the 
securities fraud class action to a special tribunal. Yet, this solution has been 
tried before in India, and we understand special tribunals tend to quickly take 
on the negative characteristics of the general courts. This may be why very 
few securities fraud lawsuits have been filed since the 2013 law was enacted. 
As far as we know, there have been very few such lawsuits despite the fact 
that there are thousands of publicly-traded companies in India. 
We propose a different solution to the problem of the Indian court 
system: class arbitration. Professor Vik Khanna suggested arbitration as a 
solution in an early article after the enactment of the 2013 law, and we pick 
up that suggestion and run with it here. As we explain, although class 
arbitration is not perfect, it may better facilitate robust private enforcement 
than the Indian court system. 
In Part II, we describe the new Indian securities fraud class action and 
explain why commentators are pessimistic that it will live up to its potential. 
In Part III, we argue that the best way for it to do so is to channel its lawsuits 
into class arbitration. 
II. THE INDIAN SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION 
A. Background 
The new Indian securities fraud class action was born of scandal. In 
2009, the founder of Satyam Computer Services, a publicly-traded Indian 
information-technology company, confessed to falsifying the financial 
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statements of the company. There were fake customer identities, fake 
invoices to inflate revenue, forged board resolutions, and loans obtained 
through illegal means.1 All told, the fictitious assets and non-existent cash 
totaled some $1.56 billion.2 Somehow, all of this evaded the detection of 
Satyam’s auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers.3 
This billion-dollar, multi-year fraud started to fall apart when Satyam 
attempted to acquire two companies without seeking shareholder approval.4 
The target companies were owned in large part by Satyam’s founder and his 
family.5 When shareholders got wind of it, they objected vociferously, and 
the acquisition was suspended.6 But the episode attracted the attention of 
regulators.7 Eventually, the founder, members of Satyam’s board, and other 
management personnel went to jail and paid fines,8 and the company’s share 
price fell from INR 544 to INR 11.50.9 
What about the shareholders? At the time, Indian law did not permit 
shareholders to recover any of their losses. Thus, Indian shareholders did not 
recoup anything from the Satyam fraud. But some shareholders did recoup 
something: American shareholders. Satyam had American Depository 
Receipts listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Thus, multiple securities 
fraud class action lawsuits were filed by Satyam’s American investors in the 
                                                          
 1 See Arjya B. Majumdar & Sneha Bhawnani, Class Action Suits – Genesis, Analysis and 
Comparison, RGNUL BOOK SERIES ON CORP. L. & CORP. AFF. (2016) at 7-8 (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883976). The founder, Mr. Raju, 
confessed to such fraud through a letter dated January 7, 2009 addressed to its board of 
directors, copied to Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) and stock exchanges: 
The gap in the Balance Sheet has arisen purely on account of inflated profits over a period of 
last several years (limited only to Satyam standalone, books of subsidiaries reflecting true 
performance). What started as a marginal gap between actual operating profit and the one 
reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow over the years. Every attempt made to 
eliminate the gap failed. As the promoters held a small percentage of equity, the concern was 
that poor performance would result in a take-over, thereby exposing the gap. It was like riding 
a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten… 
SEBI order dated July 15, 2014 (WTM/RKA/SRO/64 - 68 /2014). 
 2 See Andrea Pradesh, CBI files charge sheet in Satyam fraud case, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS 
(Apr. 7, 2009, 08:31 PM), http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhrapradesh/article 
55212.ece. 
 3 Majumdar & Bhawnani, supra note 1, at 6. 
 4 See Varun Sinha, Satyam Fraud: Why Ramalinga Raju Was Forced to Confess in 2009, 
NDTV PROFIT (Apr. 9, 2015, 05:38 PM), http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/article-
satyam-fraud-why-ramalinga-raju-was-forced-to-confess-in-2009-753607. 
 5 See Majumdar & Bhawnani, supra note 1, at 8. 
 6 See Sinha, supra note 4. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See Majumdar & Bhawnani, supra note 1, at 7 (citing Order bearing no. 
WTM/RKA/SRO/64 - 68 /2014 under sections 11(1), 11(4) and 11B of the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 in the matter of Satyam Computer Services Ltd, JULY 
15th, 2014). 
 9 See Indian IT Scandal Boss Arrested, BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2001, 08:10 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/ 7821087.stm. 
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Southern District of New York.10 In 2011, Satyam and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers agreed to settle these lawsuits for over $150 
million.11 
When there is wrongdoing like this that stretches across continents, the 
difference between the American system of private enforcement and the 
systems of public enforcement in most other places becomes apparent for all 
to see. When it does, people in other countries often do not like what they 
find. That is what happened with the recent scandal where Volkswagen 
rigged its diesel cars to turn off their pollution controls when they were not 
being tested for emissions. The 500,000 drivers in America collected billions 
of dollars in compensation; the ten million drivers in the rest of the world 
have basically received nothing.12 The difference was the American class 
action. Other countries are now beefing up their own consumer class action 
devices in response.13 
The same thing happened in India. No one could understand why the 
Indian shareholders of an Indian company got nothing when they were 
defrauded, but their American counterparts received millions of dollars. 
Thus, the Companies Act of 2013 was born to bring American-style private 
securities fraud enforcement to India. As we explain below, we think the 
Indian authorities made an admirable attempt in this endeavor. 
B. The Companies Act of 2013 
Section 245 of the Act and its enabling rules permit either 100 or 5% of 
shareholders—whichever is lesser—to file an application seeking to 
represent all other shareholders before a special tribunal called the National 
Company Litigation Tribunal (“NCLT”) for fraud and other misconduct 
committed by a company or its officers.14 Such an application can be filed 
against any type of company, whether in the public or private sector, except 
                                                          
 10 See Kevin LaCroix, Satyam Agrees to Pay $125 Million to Settle Securities Suit, THE 
D&O DIARY (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/02/articles/securities-
litigation/satyam-agrees-to-pay-125-million-to-settle-securities-suit/. 
 11 See Weil Secures Dismissal of Shareholder Class Action Against Satyam’s Former 
Directors, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.weil.com/articles/weil-
secures-dismissal-of-shareholder-class-action-against-satyams-former-directors. 
 12 In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
2672 CRB (JSC), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148374 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) at *803; Patrick 
McGee, VW Car Owners in EU Face Battle for Compensation over Scandal, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0b9bf1d2-e486-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a. 
 13 In response to the emissions scandal, the German government is pushing a new law that 
would allow consumer claims to be partially resolved on a collective basis. See Andrea 
Thomas, Germany Set to Allow Collective Lawsuits Following VW Scandal, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (May 9, 2018, 08:46 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-set-to-allow-
collective-lawsuits-following-vw-scandal-1525869967. 
 14 The Act uses the words “members” and “depositors.” See Companies Act, No. 18 of 
2013, INDIA CODE (2013), §§ 2(55), 245(1) & 245(3); National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 
2016, Gazette of India, pt.II sec. 3(i), 23 (July 22, 2016). 
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for banking companies.15 The Act also permits an investor association to file 
suit on behalf of shareholders.16 
When considering whether to accept an application, the NCLT 
considers many of the same criteria American courts consider when they 
decide whether to certify class actions17 as well as several additional 
matters.18 If the application is accepted, the NCLT is required to consolidate 
all similar applications from any other jurisdiction and publish notice to the 
class.19 Notice is published in newspapers in both English and the language 
of the state where the registered office of the company is located; 
additionally, notice is published on the company’s website, the websites of 
the NCLT, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs20, the Registrar of Companies21 
and the websites of any stock exchanges the company is listed on.22 Class 
members have the right to opt out;23 if they do not, they have the right to 
choose which lead applicant the lawsuit should proceed with; if no applicant 
garners a majority, the NCLT decides.24 
                                                          
 15 See Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 245(9). The Central Government 
of India has the power to exempt a class or classes of companies from any provisions of the 
Act for the reason of public interest. See Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 462. 
 16 Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 245(10). 
 17 The NCLT is required to consider by rule whether: (i) whether the class has so many 
members that joining them individually would be impractical making a class action desirable; 
(ii) whether there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (iii) whether the claims or 
defenses of representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; (iv) whether 
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 85 
of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Gazette of India, pt.II sec. 3(i), 23 (July 
22, 2016). 
 18 The Act requires the NCLT to consider: (i) whether the application is filed in good 
faith; (ii) any evidence before it as to the involvement of any person other than directors or 
officers of the company in matters requiring relief; (iii) whether the cause of action is one 
which the member or depositor could pursue in his own right rather than through an action 
under this section; (iv) any evidence before it as to the views of the members or depositors of 
the company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter being proceeded 
under this section; (v) where the cause of action is an act or omission that is yet to occur, 
whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be authorized 
by the company before it occurs or ratified by the company after it occurs; (vi) where the cause 
of action is an act or omission that has already occurred, whether the act or omission could be, 
and in the circumstances would be likely to be, ratified by the company. Companies Act, No. 
18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, Section 245(4). 
 19 Rule 87(3) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016. 
 20 The Ministry of Corporate Affairs is an Indian government ministry regulating the 
functioning of the corporate sector in accordance with law. About MCA, MINISTRY OF CORP. 
AFF. (last updated Sept. 23, 2019), http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/about_mca.html. 
 21 The Registrar of Companies regulates company-related matters in India, including 
incorporation, financing, directors, and shareholders. Registrar of Companies, MINISTRY OF 
CORP. AFF. (last updated Sept. 23, 2019), http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/registrarof 
companies.html. 
 22 Rule 87(1) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016. 
 23 Rule 86(3) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016. 
 24 Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 245 (5). 
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The Act provides shareholders with what appears to be broad relief. Not 
only can shareholders win injunctive and declaratory relief25—backed up 
with fines and possible imprisonment if companies and their officers fail to 
comply26—but they can also win American-style compensatory damages 
from the company, its directors, its auditors, and others.27 Professor Khanna 
has worried that the damages provision in the Act does not go far enough. He 
argues that most of the corporate disputes in India are not shareholder-
management disputes like in the United States, but disputes between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders, specifically majority shareholders 
try to exploit minority shareholders.28 He argues that the 2013 Act offers no 
monetary remedy in these situations because it is unclear whether majority 
shareholders owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, and, even if they 
do, whether majority shareholders fall under the damages provision in the 
2013 Act.29 This provision covers only the company, directors, auditors, and 
any “expert or advisor or consultant or any other person” for “any fraudulent, 
unlawful or wrongful act or conduct . . . .” 30 He worries that majority 
shareholders will not be covered under “other persons” because the “tenor” 
of the Act is to remedy shareholder-management disputes.31 
This surprises us. Indian public companies commonly have majority 
shareholders either because they are state-controlled enterprises or because 
they were historically family-owned businesses.32 This creates a classic 
agency cost problem as the actions of the majority shareholder can adversely 
impact minority shareholders.33 This fact must have been well known to 
                                                          
 25 The Act enables shareholders to obtain orders from the NCLT (i) restraining the 
company from committing acts in breach of the memorandum or articles of the company, any 
provisions of the Act or any other law, and any provisions of a resolution passed by members; 
or (ii) declaring a resolution altering the memorandum or articles of the company as void, if 
the resolution was passed by suppression of material facts or obtained by mis-statement and 
restraining the company or its directors from acting on such resolution. Companies Act, No. 
18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 245(1). 
 26 Any company that fails to comply with an order passed by the NCLT under is subject 
to a fine of not less than INR 500,000 and up to INR 2.5 million, and every officer of the 
company in default may be imprisoned for up to 3 years and fined not less than INR 25,000, 
which may extend to INR 100,000. Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 245(7). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Vikramaditya Khanna, Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Laws in India: The 
Arrival of the Class Action?, in ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW: CHINA 
AND THE WORLD, 333, 348-51 (Robin Hui Huang & Nicholas Calcina Howson eds., 2017). 
 29 Id. at 351. 
 30 Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 245, 1(g). 
 31 Khanna, supra note 28, at 354. 
 32 George S. Geis, Can Independent Blockholding Really Play Much of a Role in Indian 
Corporate Governance?, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 283, 304-306 (2007) (analyzing share 
ownership patterns of the 50 largest Indian public companies and finding that fifty-six percent 
of them have majority shareholders and eighty percent “have at least 30 percent of their shares 
owned by insiders or the government.”). 
 33 Id. at 308. 
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regulators and the legislature. 
Furthermore, the episode that lead to the Act—the Satyam affair—was 
born of an effort by majority shareholders to take advantage of minority 
shareholders. It is true that the episode ended with fraud rather than minority 
exploitation because the acquisition of the target companies was stymied. But 
do we really think the Indian authorities who enacted the 2013 Act were 
unconcerned about the events that motivated the episode to begin with? We 
doubt it. It is a well-established principle to interpret ambiguous language in 
statutes in light of the purposes behind the legislation.34 If the Indian 
authorities wanted to make sure the things that happened in the Satyam 
episode could not happen again without shareholder compensation, it would 
be fairly easy to interpret the words “any other person” and “any fraudulent, 
unlawful, or wrongful act or conduct” to include majority shareholders trying 
to exploit minority shareholders. Thus, we are not as worried as Professor 
Khanna about the breadth of the damages provision in the 2013 Act. 
C. Assessment 
Compared to private enforcement mechanisms available in much of the 
world, the 2013 Act puts India in the vanguard. Scholars have identified 
several metrics to measure how robust a nation’s class actions are,35 and, on 
all but one of these metrics, the Indian securities fraud class action fares very 
well. First, there is who can initiate the action: in some countries, individual 
shareholders are not permitted to bring class action lawsuits so that the 
lawsuits must be brought by investor associations or the government and this 
obviously limits their use.36 The Indian class action does not suffer this 
limitation. Second, there is who is included in the class action: in most 
countries, class members must affirmatively opt in to be included; this 
obviously limits the size and power of class actions.37 The Indian class action 
does not suffer this limitation either. Third, there is what relief can be 
recovered in the class action: in most countries, compensatory damages are 
not available; this obviously limits the usefulness of class actions.38 If we are 
right about how the 2013 Act should be interpreted vis-à-vis minority 
shareholders, the Indian class action fares better, here, too. On all these 
metrics, we rate the Indian securities fraud class action as one of the most 
robust in the world. 
The one metric on which the Indian class action may not fare as well as 
                                                          
 34 See Antonin Scalia, Reading Law 56 (2012); Subash C. Jain, Indian Trends in the 
Interpretative Use of Legislative History, 24 STAT. L. REV. 63, 63-73 (2003). 
 35 See Deborah Hensler, Can Private Class Actions Enforce Regulations? Do They? 
Should They?, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL 
REGULATORY PROCESS 238, 244-45 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Deborah Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POLI. & SOC. SCI. 7, 15-16 (2009). 
 38 Hensler, supra note 35, at 247. 
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those in nations like the United States, Canada, and Australia is with regard 
to how the actions are financed. If shareholders do not have access to 
adequate financing to bring their class actions, then much of the foregoing is 
for naught. In the United States, Canada, and Australia, class actions are 
financed on contingency: either lawyers or third parties invest in the actions 
and are repaid if successful by collecting a portion of the recovery.39 This 
gives shareholders access to capital to fund a large portion of what we call 
“positive-expected-value” actions—actions for which the expected trial 
judgment exceeds the class’s litigation expenses. 
It is unclear to us whether contingency financing like this will be 
available in India. On the one hand, we understand contingency financing is 
forbidden from lawyers.40 On the other hand, it appears such financing may 
now be available from third parties;41 if it takes off, shareholders in India may 
have all the resources they need. If it does not, securities fraud class actions 
will have to be financed by the shareholders themselves, with the prospect of 
recouping their litigation expenses under the loser-pays rule if they succeed.42 
If shareholders are widely dispersed, this makes financing difficult, 
especially because shareholders are liable for the defendant’s litigation 
expenses if they lose. There is, however, one provision of the 2013 Act that 
could mitigate the hardship of self-financing, at least to some extent: the Act 
sets up a public financing mechanism.43 Although it is too early to tell how 
much money will be available or what criteria will be used to disperse it, 
Canada has a fund like this and it has been used with some success.44 
Nonetheless, if we were to make one recommendation to India about how to 
revise the Act, it would be either to open securities fraud class actions to 
lawyer contingency-financing (as in the U.S. and Canada) or to grow third-
party contingency-financing (as in Australia). With that caveat, we think the 
2013 Act is an impressive attempt at private enforcement of the securities 
laws. 
Nonetheless, the early commentators have been very pessimistic at its 
chances to do much good, and the pessimism is not confined to our concerns 
about financing. Perhaps the leading assessment has been the article by 
                                                          
 39 Id. at 22-25. 
 40 Umakanth Varottil, The Evolution of Corporate Law in Post-Colonial India: From 
Transplant to Autochthony, 31 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 253, 320 (2015). 
 41 See Bar Council of India v. A.K Balaji, AIR 2018 SC 1382 at para. 35; see also 
Aishwarya Satpathy, India: Litigation Financing: Burgeoning Asset Class and Boon to 
Litigants in Need of Liquidity, http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/882644/trials+appeals+ 
compensation/Litigation+Financing+Burgeoning+Asset+Class+And+Boon+To+Litigants+I
n+Need+Of+Liquidity (last visited Jan. 20, 2020), A new start-up company in India is 
dedicated to litigation financing. See ADVOK8, https://www.advok8.in (last visited Jan. 13, 
2020). 
 42 Varottil, supra note 41. 
 43 Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 125, (3)(d). 
 44 Catherine Piche, Public Financiers as Overseers of Class Proceedings, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS. 779, 780 (2016). 
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Professor Khanna.45 He argues that the 2013 Act will be of “limited value” 
because of four shortcomings: “(1) the glacial speed of the Indian courts, (2) 
lack of contingency fees, (3) the limited availability of monetary remedies . 
. ., and (4) the interaction between ownership structure in India.”46 We 
addressed the latter three shortcomings above; we agree these could be 
shortcomings, but we are not as pessimistic that they cannot be overcome. 
That leaves the most serious shortcoming: the glacial speed of the Indian 
courts. 
A great deal has been written about how slow the Indian court system 
is. Professor Khanna cited some of this writing and we have read other 
accounts ourselves.47 Perhaps our favorite statistic is this one: the average 
civil appeal in some courts takes over six years to complete!48 
The causes appear to be many. First, there is a lack of judges: “India has 
one of the world’s lowest ratios of judges to population in the world, with 
only 13 judges for every million people, compared with in developed nations. 
As a result, scores of cases are heard every day, which leads to a large number 
of adjournments, judges passing cases between them, and increasingly long 
queues of people waiting outside courtrooms on the off-chance that their case 
is heard.”49 One reason there are so few judges is because judges are 
apparently not paid very well (much less than lawyers); we understand this 
has led to a steady decline in the number of people who want to become 
judges.50 
Second, lawyer compensation. We understand that lawyers charge by 
“appearance,”51 which is not unlike charging by the hour. Charging by the 
hour or by appearance gives lawyers an incentive to drag cases out so they 
can make more money. One of the virtues of the contingency fee system—
besides the one noted above of opening the plaintiff side of litigation to 
                                                          
 45 Khanna, supra note 28, at 334-35. 
 46 Id. at 333-58. 
 47 See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Stephen A. Mayo, A.M. Ahmadi & Abhishek M. Singhvi, 
Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preservation of the Adversarial Process, 
30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1998); Barry Bearak, In India, the Wheels of Justice Hardly 
Move, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/01/ world/in-india-the-
wheels-of-justice-hardly-move.html; Umakanth Varottil, India: The Efficacy of India’s Legal 
System as a Tool for Investor Protection, in GLOBAL SECURITIES LITIGATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 816, 839 (Pierre-Henri Conac ed., 2019) (“Cases can on average take 15 years 
to achieve final outcomes.”). 
 48 How To Speed Up Judiciary: Let’s Make India’s Slow Courts World Class, ECON. 
TIMES (May 16, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-
nation/how-to-speed-up-judiciary-lets-make-indias-slow-courts-world-
class/articleshow/58693205.cms. 
 49 Vidhi Doshi, India’s Long Wait for Justice: 27m Court Cases Trapped In Legal 
Logjam, THE GUARDIAN (May 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ 
may/05/indias-long-wait-for-justice-27-million-court-cases-trapp ed-in-a-legal-logjam. 
 50 Chodosh et. al, supra note 47, at 47; Doshi, supra note 49. 
 51 Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and 
U.S. Supreme Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. REV. 173, 184 n.50 (2013). 
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financing—is that it gives lawyers an incentive to wrap things up quickly so 
they can get paid. 
Third, inefficient procedural rules. We understand that the judges in 
India freely grant lawyers adjournments that would not be tolerated in other 
countries.52 Some commentators think these adjournments alone cost India’s 
economy trillions of rupees every year.53 Similarly, the Code of Civil 
Procedure does not require litigants to appear in court in person. Instead, 
litigants can send a “pleader” in their stead.54 But the pleader cannot accept 
certain filings; hence, pleaders are often sent as a strategy to delay 
judgments.55 Finally, the Code is less flexible than in other counties, and the 
lack of flexibility can lead risk-averse lawyers to over litigate. For example, 
litigants are not allowed to amend their original pleadings, which have led to 
prolific filings that bog down rather than speed up proceedings.56 
Of course, none of this was lost on the Indian authorities who enacted 
the 2013 Act. Their solution was to channel all securities fraud class actions 
to a special tribunal, the NCLT. The NCLT is a new tribunal. Although it 
was created in 2002,57 it was under a constitutional cloud until 2015.58 But it 
has now been up and running for a few years, currently with 13 benches in 
different regions of India, with the principal bench in New Delhi.59 Thus, it 
is too early to tell whether the new tribunal will be affected by the same 
malaise that affects most other courts in India, but the early signs are not 
good.60 Indeed, India has many special courts, and they have not escaped the 
problems we identified above.61 For this reason, commentators like Professor 
                                                          
 52 Supra note 50; DAKSH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE SURVEY 2015-16 AT 12 (2016), 
http://dakshindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Daksh-access-to-justice-survey.pdf. 
 53 Doshi, supra note 49. 
 54 Matthieu Chemin, Does the Quality of the Judiciary Shape Economic Activity? 
Evidence from India (Oct. 11, 2004) (unpublished paper, London School of Economics), 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/03122004/chemin.pdf. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons From The Indian 
Experience, NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 360 (2009); see also Vikramaditya Khanna, 
Regulating Squeeze-Outs in India: A Comparative Perspective, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 1009, 1018 
n. 48 (2015). 
 58 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2015), Writ Petition No. 1072 (India). 
 59 NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL BENCHES, https://www.nclt.gov.in/content/ 
national-company-law-tribunal-benches (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
 60 Surbhi Prasad, NCLT Benches May be Doubled to Cope With Rising Cases, FIN. 
EXPRESS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/nclt-benches-may-be-
doubled-to-cope-with-rising-cases/1276014/; Dilsher Dhillon, India’s Supreme Court Slams 
the Government for Leaving the Country’s Bankruptcy Court Short-Staffed, BUS. INSIDER 
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.in/sc-slams-govt-for-lack-of-staff-atnclt/ 
articleshow/68594331.cms. 
 61 Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal 
Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE 
RULE OF LAW, (2003) (discussing the congestion of the Indian courts and unsuccessful 
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Khanna are pessimistic that the NCLT will fare any better.62 He may be right: 
as far as we can tell, there have been very few securities fraud class actions 
filed under the 2013 Act.63 This is despite the fact that India has thousands of 
publicly-traded companies.64 By comparison, in the United States, roughly 
two percent of publicly-traded companies are sued for securities fraud every 
year,65 and the best estimates are that there are three times as many securities 
fraud violations as there are lawsuits.66 
If a special tribunal cannot save the Indian securities fraud class action, 
what can? Professor Khanna suggested arbitration as an answer.67 As we 
explain in the next part, we think he is right. Although Professor Khanna did 
not specify what kind of arbitration he had in mind, the United States has 
experience with class action arbitration, and we think it could work well in 
India. 
III. CLASS ACTION ARBITRATION 
A. Background 
Arbitration is a well-established, private, dispute-resolution mechanism 
in the United States. Parties choose whether to send their dispute to one or 
more arbitrators and whatever result is reached is respected by our court 
system and entitled to all the same res judicata effect of a court judgment. 
The virtues of arbitration are well known. The parties are allowed to 
specify their own procedural rules; thus, they can specify rules that 
                                                          
attempts to use alternative court systems as a method of avoiding the logjams). 
 62 Khanna, supra note 28, at 354–55. 
 63 According to the NCLT website as of December 2016, only two actions had been filed: 
K N Pillai v. R Prasanth (Mumbai Bench) and Vijaykumar v. SPM Exports Pvt. Ltd. 
(Bangaluru Bench). As of November 2018, we found only nine more: Jacob Mathew Vs. A.V. 
George and Ors. Mr. Samvid Legal (384/245/PB/2018); Zetatek Technologies Pvt. Ltd Vs. 
Gagan Aerospace Ltd & Ors (87/245/PB/2018); Atul Khanna Vs. Union of India & Ors. 
(109/245/PB/2018); Shumanto Gupta Vs. Ablaze Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd & Ors. 
(408(ND)/2017); Kamlesh Kumar Sen & Ors Vs. Gee Pee Hi Tech Industies Ltd & Ors 
(124/245(1)/PB/2018); Abhimanyu Singh & Ors Vs. Brijnandan Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors 
(129/245/PB/2018); Shiv Sevak Singh Vs. Ablaze Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Ors 
(408(ND)/2017); UCO Bank Vs. Shree Shyam Pulp And Mills Ltd. (129/245/PB/2018); Mr. 
Sanjay Lalchand Siriah Vs. M /s White Street Engineering Solutions Pvt Ltd & Ors 
(212/245/NCLT/MB/MAH/2017). 
 64 N. Balasubramanian & R.V. Anand, Ownership Trends in Corporate India 2001-
2011 Evidence and Implications, (2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2303684, at 12 (as of 2011, India had 
1657 publicly traded companies). 
 65 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1801 (2007). 
 66 See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is Corporate 
Fraud? (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2222608. 
 67 Khanna, supra note 28, at 356-67. 
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streamline litigation and save them money.68 The cases are handled by 
professionals selected by the parties; thus, the parties do not have to take their 
chances before an idiosyncratic judge or jury.69 The proceedings can remain 
confidential, thus avoiding negative publicity.70 Arbitrators have greater 
flexibility in fashioning remedies and applying procedural rules.71 
Arbitration can overcome jurisdictional hurdles and resolve similar disputes 
in a single forum.72 Enforcement of arbitration awards tends to be faster and 
                                                          
 68 See, e.g., S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2013) (“‘Runaway juries’ are one reason why U.S. class actions 
are considered unduly risky and expensive by the corporate community and the elimination of 
jury trials might well lead to lower awards. Removing the threat of a jury should also have a 
moderating effect on settlement negotiations since the parties’ discussions will operate within 
a much more realistic framework.”); Sarah Clasby Engel & Sherry Tropin, Class Action 
Arbitration: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 145, 150 (2009) (“Rule 21 of 
the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules governs the exchange of information between the 
parties in commercial arbitration under its auspices: at the arbitrator’s discretion or at the 
request of the parties, the arbitrator directs document production and identification of 
witnesses to be called.”); Stephen J. Ware, The Case For Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration 
Agreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. 
ARB. 251, 258 (2006) (discussing how savings from lower “process costs” of arbitration can 
be passed down to consumers and employees); Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. 
Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for Stockholder 
Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1210 (2013) (“Wronged stockholders [in 
individual arbitrations] will receive quicker payment – although the average federal securities 
class action takes more than four years to settle, studies on arbitration have found it is two to 
three times faster than similar litigation.”); S.I. Strong, From Class to Collective: The De-
Americanization of Class Arbitration, 26 ARB. INT’L 493, 508 (2010) (“As it turns out, 
empirical evidence suggests that although U.S. class arbitrations tend to take more time than 
bilateral arbitrations, class arbitration takes less time than class action litigation. Thus, to the 
extent that a dispute must be resolved on a collective basis, defendants may be better off in 
arbitration rather than in court.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 51 (2010) (“[T]he central and primary value of arbitration is not speed, 
or economy, or privacy, or neutral expertise, but rather the ability of users to make key process 
choices to suit their particular needs.”). 
 69 STRONG, supra note 68, at 299 (“Indeed, many parties prefer arbitration because they 
can choose experienced panelists with particular expertise in the subject matter at hand. As a 
result, a properly selected arbitral tribunal may be less likely to make an error than a judge 
who does not specialize in the issues at bar.”);. 
 70 STRONG, supra note 68, at 300 (“[P]arties, even to large-scale disputes, may prefer to 
adopt private and confidential procedures so as to avoid negative publicity that could injure 
their corporate reputation and goodwill.”); Kristen M. Blankley, Class Actions Behind Closed 
Doors? How Consumer Claims Can (and Should) Be Resolved by Class-Action Arbitration, 
20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 451, 470 (2005) (“Confidentiality is usually heralded as the 
biggest advantage of choosing an ADR procedure, including arbitration, over litigation.”). 
 71 Blankley, supra note 70, at 467 (“Arbitrators are not required to follow the law when 
making their decisions. One of the ‘benefits’ of arbitration is that an arbitrator is allowed to 
consider the equities of a case, even if those equities are contradictory to the law.”); W. Mark 
C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 95–96 (2007) 
(noting the flexibility arbitrators have in fashioning appropriate remedies and implementing 
innovative procedures that courts have been hesitant to accept). 
 72 STRONG, supra note 68, at 289; Id. at 298 (“Arbitration provides an appealing 
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less costly, and many awards are complied with voluntarily.73 
There are, of course, downsides to arbitration as well. If one party has 
more bargaining power than the other, they may select procedural rules and 
a pool of arbitrators that are biased in one party’s favor.74 In addition, because 
the parties must pay the arbitrators, arbitration can be more expensive than 
litigation in some respects.75 Moreover, confidential proceedings undermine 
the deterrent value of litigation by hiding wrongdoing from the public.76 
Finally, if too many cases go to arbitration, it can retard the evolution of the 
law in the court system.77 
Nonetheless, the growing popularity of arbitration in the United States 
shows that many people see arbitration as, on balance, a net positive. Many 
consumers, employees, and businesses now enter into contracts that say in 
the event a dispute arises with the counterparty, the dispute will be sent to 
arbitration if either party so chooses. 
Although most of the disputes that go to arbitration are one-on-one 
disputes, it is possible to bring class-wide disputes to arbitration, and, for a 
time, it was done regularly in the United States. It is not done much anymore 
in the United States because the Supreme Court has ruled that companies are 
allowed to ban class actions in their arbitration proceedings if they want to, 
forcing plaintiffs who sue them into one-on-one arbitration.78 Because one-
on-one arbitration is less threatening to companies than class-wide 
arbitration, companies are now rewriting their arbitration clauses to ban class 
actions.79 We have decried this practice because it basically insulates 
                                                          
alternative to problems associated with jurisdiction, since parties to an arbitration agreement 
grant jurisdiction over the matter to the arbitral tribunal as a matter of consent.”). 
 73 See STRONG, supra note 68, at 301. 
 74 Theodore Eisenberg et. al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 
872–73 (2008); See Scott & Silverman, supra note 68, at 1216 (“Some critics have cited 
arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution as having an industry bias . . . .”); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1650 
(2005); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Unfair “Arbitration Clauses”, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
695, 732 (2001) (surveying arbitration clauses in franchisor agreements and specific 
provisions governing selection of arbitrators). This concern has not appeared to come to 
fruition in securities arbitration. 
 75 Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial 
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 
335 (1995). 
 76 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 
and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 270 (2004); Laurie Kratky 
Dore, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time To Let Some Sun Shine In On Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI. KENT L. REV. 463, 491 (2006). 
 77 Bruce Hay, Christopher Rendall-Jackson, % David Rosenberg, Litigating BP’s 
Contribution Claims in Publicly Subsidized Courts: Should Contracting Parties Pay Their 
Own Way?, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1919, 1944-46 (2011). 
 78 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
 79 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Mar. 
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companies from class action liability, neutering the private enforcement of 
the law.80 But before the Supreme Court allowed companies to do this, there 
were many years of experience with class arbitration in the United States. We 
describe that experience here and explain why it might be the best solution 
to the concern with sluggish courts in India. 
B. Class Arbitration in the United States 
Class arbitration is basically a class action that takes place in arbitration 
rather than court. Like a class action in a court, a class representative seeks 
to assert claims on her own behalf as well as on the behalf of absent class 
members.81 Yet, a neutral arbitrator or panel of arbitrators selected and paid 
for by the parties typically makes all the decisions that would be entrusted to 
a judge.82 Class arbitration first emerged in the United States in the 1980’s83 
and received its blessing from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003.84 
Although the parties can specify their own rules for class arbitration by 
contract, the large arbitration organizations like the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) have adopted their own default class arbitration rules, 
and these rules are modeled on the rules that govern in federal court.85 The 
following are the three phases of a class arbitration under the AAA’s rules: 
Clause Construction Award. The arbitrator first determines as a 
                                                          
2015, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015.pdf. 
 80 Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 199 (2015). 
 81 See STRONG, supra note 68, at 150 (citation omitted) (“[A]rbitration is a process by 
which parties consensually submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision maker, select by 
and for the parties, to render a binding decision resolving a dispute in accordance with neutral, 
adjudicatory procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard.”); see also S.I. 
Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, 
and A Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 211 (2012) (distinguishing 
class arbitration from other multiparty proceedings and providing a “working definition” of 
class arbitration). 
 82 See Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 
90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (2012). 
 83 See STRONG, supra note 68, at 9; see also Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United 
States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 21, 
22 (2012). 
 84 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 85 Am. Arb. Ass’n, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (effective Oct. 8, 2003) 
[hereinafter AAA Rules], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Supplementary%20Rules% 
20for%20Class%20 Arbitrations.pdf; JAMS Class Action Procedures (effective May 1, 2009), 
JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures/ (last visited Jul. 6, 2018) 
[hereinafter JAMS Procedures]. The National Arbitration Forum (NAF) once had its own 
procedures but has since stopped administering class arbitrations. See Jean R. Sternlight, As 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 72 (2000) (“Indeed, one arbitration provider, the National Arbitration 
Forum (NAF), has marketed its rules to corporations in part with the assurance that its rules 
do not allow for class actions.”). 
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“threshold matter” whether the applicable arbitration clause permits 
the arbitration to proceed as a class proceeding.86 After this “award” 
is rendered, the arbitrator must stay proceedings for at least thirty days 
to “permit any party to move a court of competent jurisdiction to 
confirm or to vacate the [award].”87 
Class Determination Award. The arbitrator then determines whether 
to certify the proposed class using criteria that parallel Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23 for numerosity, commonality of questions of law and fact, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation.88 In addition to these 
criteria, the arbitrator may certify a class only if “each class member 
has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause which 
is substantially similar to that signed by the class representative(s) and 
each of the other class members.”89 The arbitrator’s class certification 
determination must be set forth in a “reasoned, partial final award.”90 
And again, the rules provide for another thirty day stay of all 
proceedings to permit any party to seek judicial review of this 
“award.”91 
Final Award. After notice “given to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort” is given, the arbitration moves to 
the merits phase.92 Whether favorable to the class or not, the final 
award must define the class with specificity, state to whom notice was 
sent, and identify who (if anyone) elected to exclude herself from the 
class.93 The arbitrator must approve any settlement or voluntary 
dismissal and conduct a fairness hearing.94 The arbitrator also rules on 
requests for exclusion from and objections to the settlement.95 Judicial 
review of the final award is permitted as well. 
The two main costs of class arbitration are filing and administrative fees 
                                                          
 86 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 3. 
 87 Id. 
 88 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 4. For a detailed discussion comparing the language 
of the AAA Rules, the JAMS Procedures, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, see STRONG, supra note 68, 
at 50. 
 89 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 4(a)(6). 
 90 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 5(a); see also Alyssa S. King, Too Much Power and 
Not Enough: Arbitrators Face the Class Dilemma, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031, 1040 
(2017) (“The Rules require that class arbitration dockets and decisions be public and set out a 
series of three decisions that the arbitrator must issue. These decisions are known as awards. 
The first two are procedural decisions. These awards are known as ‘partial awards’ rather than 
‘full’ awards, which would decide the merits. If the arbitrator does not plan to revisit a 
decision, an award is called a ‘final award,’ so a final procedural decision would be a ‘partial 
final award.”). 
 91 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 5(d). 
 92 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 6(a). 
 93 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 7. 
 94 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 8(a)(3). 
 95 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 8(d). 
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and arbitrator compensation. The AAA rules provide for a “preliminary filing 
fee of $3,350” to be paid by the party bringing the class arbitration.96 If the 
arbitration proceeds beyond the clause construction phase, that party shall 
pay a “supplemental filing fee . . . calculated based on the amount claimed in 
the class arbitration and in accordance with the fee schedule . . . in 
[commercial cases].”97 For example, if the amount of the claims in the class 
arbitration ranges from $1 million to less than $10 million, an additional 
$8,475 fee is incurred.98 Arbitrator compensation and hearing room rental 
fees are not included in these administrative fees.99 Anecdotal evidence100 
suggests that AAA arbitrators can charge anywhere from $300 to $1,150 per 
hour.101 The arbitrator has discretion to shift fees based on the arbitration 
agreement or applicable law.102 
The AAA requires at least one arbitrator to be selected from a special 
roster of arbitrators experienced in class proceedings.103 AAA arbitrators, in 
general, have a minimum of ten years of senior-level business experience, 
professional experience, or legal practice.104 Many AAA arbitrators are 
former federal or state judges.105 
The AAA is the largest arbitration association in the United States and 
it keeps an online docket of all class arbitrations it has administered.106 As of 
                                                          
 96 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 11(a). 
 97 Id. 
 98 AM. ARB. ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES: 
ADMINISTRATIVE FEE SCHEDULES (amended and effective May 1, 2018), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial_Arbitration_ Fee_Schedule_1.pdf. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Neither AAA nor JAMS publishes its rosters of arbitrators and their fees. 
 101 Deborah Rothman, Trends in Arbitrator Compensation, DISP. RESOL. MAG. 8-11 
(Spring 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/dispute_  
resolution_magazine/spring2017/3_rothman_trends_in_arbitrator.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 102 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 11(b) (“Disputes regarding the parties’ obligation to 
pay administrative fees or arbitrator’s compensation pursuant to applicable law or the parties’ 
agreement may be determined by the arbitrator. Upon the joint application of the parties, 
however, an arbitrator other than the arbitrator appointed to decide the merits of the arbitration, 
shall be appointed by the AAA to render a partial final award solely related to any disputes 
regarding the parties’ obligations to pay administrative fees or arbitrator’s compensation.”). 
 103 AAA Rules, supra note 85, at rule 2(a) (requiring at least one arbitrator to come from 
the class arbitrator roster). 
 104 AM. ARB. ASS’N, QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR ADMITTANCE TO THE AAA NATIONAL 
ROSTER OF ARBITRATORS, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/ 
Qualification_Criteria_for_Admittance_to_the_AAA_National_Roster_of_Arbitrators.pdf. 
 105 Am. Arb. Ass’n, Arbitrators & Mediators, https://www.adr.org/aaa-panel (last visited 
Jul. 6, 2018). 
 106 Am. Arb. Ass’n, Class Action Case Docket, https://tinyurl.com/yactk68u (last visited 
Jun. 29, 2018). Even though the online docket is publicly available, an arbitration-level 
analysis would be very difficult, as each case docket contains PDFs of awards and demands 
and sorting and filtering is allowed by only a few fields (case type, case status, date received, 
etc.). We have yet to find a study in the literature that has the same type of granular summary 
statistics on a larger, more up-to-date sample of AAA class arbitration than the 283 the AAA 
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July 6, 2018, the docket contains 517 total class arbitrations composed of 75 
pending and 442 closed arbitrations.107 The earliest class arbitration is dated 
December 18, 2002; the most recent is dated May 31, 2018.108 
Table 1 presents detailed summary statistics on the 283 AAA class 
arbitrations filed from 2003 to sometime in 2009.109 Table 1 shows that in the 
135 class arbitrations where a clause construction award was rendered, class 
proceedings were permitted seventy percent of the time. Table 1 also shows 
that of the forty-eight class arbitrations where a class certification award was 
rendered, roughly half granted class certification.110 The data also shows that, 
although there were a good number of business-to-business class arbitrations, 
the most common class arbitrations were consumers suing businesses. 
Interestingly, very few of these arbitrations reach the final stage. As of 
July 6, 2018, there have been only eight “merits awards,” with four of them 
approving settlements or partial settlements.111 We do not know what 
happened to the other arbitrations where class certification was granted; they 
may still be ongoing. 
 
  
                                                          
analyzed in its amicus brief. Brief of Am. Arb. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), 2009 WL 2896309. 
 107 Id.; see also Gregory A. Litt & Tina Praprotnik, After Stolt-Nielsen, Circuits Split, but 
AAA Filings Continue, 27 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 1, 1 (2012) (charting AAA class 
arbitrations filed between 2003 and 2012 on an annual basis). 
 108 Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 106. 
 109 See the notes accompanying Table 1, infra, on the uncertainty of the end date of the 
analysis. 
 110 See Engel & Tropin, supra note 68, at 151 (“The AAA’s brief filed in Stolt-Nielson 
appears to indicate a greater likelihood of class certification in arbitration than in class action 
litigation. Once class certification is granted, corporate defendants have a greater incentive to 
enter into serious settlement negotiations. While class action arbitration may not be the 
expeditious procedure contemplated when arbitration law was developed, a faster resolution 
than in litigation may still be likely.”). 
 111 Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 106 (filtered for award type as “merits awards”). 
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Source: Data obtained from Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (No. 8-1198), 2009 
WL 2896309. 
* The AAA’s amicus brief is unclear on the exact start and end date of its analysis:  “In the nearly six 
years that the Class Rules have been in effect, the AAA has administered 283 class arbitrations, 121 of 
which remain active.” The AAA class arbitration rules went into effect on October 8, 2003 and the 
amicus brief was filed on Sept. 4, 2009. 
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C. Special Concerns with Class Arbitration 
One of the reasons the Supreme Court let companies escape class 
actions in arbitration is because the Court thought that class arbitration did 
not reap many of the benefits of individual arbitration.112 As we noted, 
although the parties could create their own rules, the AAA’s rules largely 
mirror the class action rules in federal court. It is not clear whether this makes 
class arbitration any cheaper or quicker. For example, the AAA reported for 
the cases in Table 1 “[t]he median time from the filing of an arbitration to the 
Clause Construction Award [was] 281 days and a mean of 313 days. The 
median time from the Clause Construction Award to the Class Determination 
Award [was] 416 days and a mean of 501 days. For all 162 closed cases, the 
median time frame from filing to settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal [was] 
583 days with a mean of 630 days.”113 These durations may not be any 
quicker than class actions in court, which are settled in less than three years, 
on average.114 
Another example is confidentiality. Under the AAA’s rules, class 
arbitrations are not entirely confidential proceedings.115 It is not clear how 
they could be. After all, class members must be notified of the proceedings 
in order to have a chance to protect their rights. This makes class arbitration 
very different from individual arbitration. 
A separate concern is that, per a federal statute, judicial review of 
arbitration decisions is very constrained. Although the AAA rules allow for 
appeals at three different points, judges can’t do much on these appeals. 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, judges can overturn arbitration awards 
only if there has been fraud or other misconduct perpetrated on the arbitrator; 
mistakes by the arbitrator are not grounds for reversal.116 This is concerning 
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because one of the most important roles that judges play in class actions is to 
protect absent class members from exploitation by class counsel and the 
defendant. Absent class members do not have a role in selecting 
arbitrators117—arbitrators are selected before class certification, and, in any 
event, absent class members are, well, absent—and some commentators 
worry the arbitrators will not look out for absent class members like judges 
do.118 This concern is magnified if the arbitrators’ compensation comes from 
the defendant and class counsel.119 If courts could more meaningfully review 
the decisions critical for absent class members—certification, settlement, 
attorneys’ fees—commentators would be less concerned. But that review is 
not possible under American law. 
The lack of meaningful judicial review is a concern not just for absent 
class members but for defendants as well. Class action cases tend to be very 
high stakes because the size of class-wide damages can threaten companies 
will substantial liability. If the arbitrators make a million- or billion-dollar 
mistake, defendants rest more easily if they can get the mistake fixed. But, 
again, that is not possible. This is one of the facts that led the Supreme Court 
to deem arbitration as incompatible with class actions.120 Commentators, too, 
have been skeptical companies would ever prefer class arbitration to class 
action litigation in court.121 
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IV. CLASS ARBITRATION IN INDIA? 
Like the United States, Indian law respects arbitration agreements,122 
including agreements to arbitrate fraud claims, at least those that are not of a 
serious or complicated nature.123 Despite the shortcomings listed in the 
previous Part, we think securities fraud class arbitration can solve many of 
the problems with the Indian court system that have made commentators 
pessimistic about the new securities fraud class action. 
First, consider the inefficient procedural rules in the Indian court 
system. In arbitration, the parties will be free to devise their own procedural 
rules, including rules allowing for more flexible pleadings as well as to 
prohibit plentiful adjournments and delays caused by litigants who fail to 
appear in person. Although class arbitration may not be any faster than class 
action litigation in the United States, that is because the rules in arbitration 
largely mirror those in court. India, by contrast, can use arbitration to avoid 
its inefficient court rules. 
Second, consider the shortage of judges in Indian courts. There will be 
no shortage of arbitrators because the parties will select as many arbitrators 
as they need and compensate them for whatever time they need to spend on 
their cases. 
We are less sure that arbitration can significantly change how Indian 
lawyers are compensated in order to encourage them to speed cases along. 
We assume it would be unlawful to pay lawyers who arbitrate with 
contingency fees any more than it would be to pay lawyers who litigate in 
court. Nonetheless, as we noted above, we think India should rescind its 
prohibition on contingency fees. 
Moreover, we do not believe the concerns with class arbitration in the 
United States should discourage India from trying it for itself. We have 
already said that we believe arbitration will be faster than litigation in India 
if the parties tweak the rules in arbitration. In addition, it should be 
remembered that, unlike the court system, arbitration is not free to the parties: 
they have to pay the arbitrator by the hour, as in the United States. We think 
this will make it especially unlikely sclerosis will set in. 
Nor are we concerned about the lack of confidentiality in class 
arbitration. There is probably too much confidentiality to begin with in 
arbitration, so it is good that class members and the public can see what is 
going on in class arbitration. 
Finally, if the lack of judicial review in the United States is deemed a 
problem, then the solution in India is simply not to adopt the constrained 
judicial review of the Federal Arbitration Act. But we think India should be 
careful here: much of the gain of using arbitration to avoid the Indian court 
system will be lost if India reintroduces the court system on appeal. As we 
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noted above, some appeals take six years to resolve in that court system. 
Thus, whatever judicial review is allowed, it should be something less than 
the ordinary review of the Indian court system. 
Our bigger concern is that Indian companies will have no reason to 
agree to class arbitration because the Indian court system is so slow that it 
deters shareholders from filing securities fraud class actions at all; why would 
companies wish to facilitate securities fraud actions against them by agreeing 
to arbitration? They probably won’t, which means that India may have to 
enact legislation that gives either side of a securities dispute the right to 
invoke arbitration. If the parties know that either side can invoke arbitration, 
this will give both of them the incentive to specify the terms of any arbitration 
beforehand. In this regard, we are recommending a different path from the 
one taken in the United States where both sides must agree to arbitration. 
Nonetheless, we think the difference will be necessary to bring corporations 
along. 
And that is not the only difference we recommend. Unlike the United 
States, India may not wish to give the parties complete carte blanche in 
fashioning procedural rules. In the United States, companies used this 
powerto insulate themselves from class actions altogether; it would 
obviously defeat the purpose of this entire line of inquiry if Indian companies 
could do the same. Thus, Indian legislation may need to require that any 
arbitration for securities fraud violations includes access to the class action 
device specified in the 2013 Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although, as we have explained, India has now enacted one of the most 
robust private enforcement devices for shareholder-management disputes in 
the world, commentators are very pessimistic that it will do much good 
because the Indian court system is notoriously unhurried. Indeed, very few 
shareholder class actions have been filed in the five years since the 
Companies Act of 2013 has become law. We believe the solution to this 
problem is not to try to reform the Indian court system but to send the actions 
to private arbitration. Indeed, until our Supreme Court allowed companies to 
evade class actions altogether through arbitration clauses, the United States 
had a great deal of experience resolving class disputes through arbitration. 
We believe that, with some tweaks, this experience points a way forward in 
India toward fertile use of Section 245 of the Companies Act. 
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